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Emil Avdaliani：The Rise of a Multi-aligned South Caucasus

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1 天前

2025 年 11 月 25 日

明報

【明報文章】The South Caucasus has long been considered as one of the regions where Russia exercised near exclusive level of influence. The geography allowed Moscow to project power to the Black and Caspian seas and most all into the Middle East. Yet, over the past few years, this began to change. Local and much wider geopolitical processes changed the dynamic among which Russia’s war in Ukraine which began in February 2022 stands out as a primary accelerator. But as will be argued below the shift is much more fundamental and is much connected to geography pushing the South Caucasus more toward the Middle East.

Embroiled in a long-term conflict which required all economic and military resources, Russia has not been able to uphold its strong position in the South Caucasus it traditionally enjoyed prior to 2022. The regional countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – swiftly moved to use this emerging room for maneuver. Azerbaijan returned the territories which had long been under Armenia’s control and the Russian peacemakers stationed in the Nagorno-Karabakh region were seen standing by. Ever since September 2023 when the Armenian statelet fell Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia gradually soured. In Baku the need to rely on Russia’s benevolence has significantly decreased and the country became more confident in its foreign policy. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its ties with Israel, Pakistan, improved relations with Iran, developed strategic relations with the Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and most notably established strategic partnership agreement with China. Baku has even resumed talks with the EU on re-establishing strategic partnership and have improved relations with the US under the Trump administration.

Other regional countries have likewise pivoted from Russia. Armenia, discontent with Moscow’s inability and unwillingness to help its ally during and following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020, chose to pursue a more diversified foreign policy. Yerevan has engaged Ankara to establish diplomatic ties, open their common border and build close economic ties. Armenia has also established a series of strategic partnerships with China, the UK, the US and is about to do the same with the Islamic Republic. Its relations with the EU are likewise expanding with a visa liberalization program and much closer economic and political engagement now discussed.

More importantly, Armenia has moved to mend ties with Azerbaijan. The two agreed on the stipulations of the peace treaty they plan to sign in the near future. Both also endorsed the US’ involvement in the peace mediation – a notable deviation from traditionally Russian involvement in the process. For instance, Moscow helped to end the hostilities back in 2020 but was gradually sidelined by Baku and Yerevan from peace process. Armenia has even managed to limit its dependence on Russian weaponry. India is now Armenia’s biggest arms supplier reversing a trend whereby Russia had dominated Armenia’s .

Then there is Georgia, which similar to its neighbors, has strived to diversify its foreign policy by building a strategic partnership with China and Central Asian countries and increasingly looking at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a vital source of investment. More importantly, Georgia moved to stabilize relations with Russia which continues to occupy 20 percent of its territory. This all takes place amid Georgia’s stagnating ties with the West. In short, Tbilisi has limited its dependence on a single geopolitical player in favor of multiple parentships.

But there are much deeper, historical shifts which are taking place. One aspect that defined the post-Soviet period in the South Caucasus was intense rivalry between Russia and the Western countries. Past few years however show that this concept changed dramatically and the picture now has become more fluid. The South Caucasus has become a highly congested geopolitical arena with multiple powers now competing for influence. The US, the EU, Turkey, Iran, increasingly so China and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, all have stakes in the South Caucasus whether through major investments into infrastructure projects, alliances or partnerships propped up by expanding trade ties. This signals the end of the post-Soviet era and the beginning of new, more multi-aligned South Caucasus, which now increasingly serves as a connecting space between multiple regions. With that comes greater geopolitical impact.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.